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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
A previous review examined conceptual issues, historical information, and 
econometric evidence regarding the impact of information technology (IT) on 
employment, skills, and wages (see Handel 2003).  This review examines evidence from 
industry-specific and case studies for the light they shed on key issues raised in the 
previous paper, i.e., the extent to which IT eliminates jobs, raises job skill requirements, 
and, consequently, contributes to increased wage inequality between less- and more- 
skilled workers.  The concern is particularly relevant for the last twenty years, during 
which wage inequality rose dramatically, especially in the 1980s.  As reviewed in Handel 
(2003), many economists believe that computers and information technology have 
increased the demand for human capital, an idea known as skill-biased technological 
change.  Sectoral and case study evidence are particularly valuable because they tend to 
give a much more concrete idea of how specific technologies affect jobs in particular 
contexts.  
As discussed in Handel (2003), computers might increase job skill demands and 
inequality through different means: 
1. IT may raise skill requirements by altering the task content of existing jobs 
because: 
A. the equipment and software are difficult to learn;  
B. the character of work changes from manual or routine to a more 
conceptual or abstract set of tasks; 
C. information becomes decentralized, which encourages firms to 
restructure work roles to require that front-line workers use this 
information as part of taking on more decision-making and problem-
solving responsibilities formerly reserved for more-skilled workers.  
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2. IT may raise overall skill requirements by shifting the distribution of workers 
between occupations, increasing the relative numbers in high-skilled 
occupations, even if the content of most jobs remains relatively unchanged.  
This may occur because: 
A. IT requires a greater number of skilled workers to manage the 
technology itself (e.g., programmers, technicians, maintenance 
workers) or to analyze the information it generates (e.g., accountants, 
market researchers);  
B. IT reduces the number of less-skilled workers by automating some 
positions out of existence (e.g., data entry clerks, telephone operators). 
 
3. IT may alter the distribution of jobs across industries in the direction of those 
that are relatively more skill intensive (e.g., reducing manufacturing 
employment and increasing high-end service employment), even if it does not 
alter the nature of work or the distribution of workers across occupations 
within industries (Attewell 1987). 
 
Although the preceding presents changes in job content and changes in the 
occupational and industrial distributions of employment as distinct, any actual case may 
involve some combination of them.  Nevertheless, this is a useful analytical framework 
for organizing the evidence and understanding the kinds of forces that may be at work as 
a result of the expansion of IT in the workplace. 
As described below, there are other researchers in the deskilling tradition who 
believe that the use of IT tends to lower the skill requirements of most jobs (e.g., 
Braverman 1974), though strong versions of this thesis have much less currency today 
than previously. 
More common is the view that computers and automation are better able to 
substitute for less-skilled tasks, such as physical work or routine paperwork processing, 
rather than more-skilled tasks involving decision making and judgment.  In addition, 
automated manufacturing equipment has long been viewed as requiring a greater number 
of maintenance workers (Woodward 1965), a view confirmed by studies cited in the 
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previous review (e.g., Fernandez 2001), as well as some described below.  Both 
tendencies would increase skill requirements through changes in the occupational 
distribution.   
In addition, many argue that computers in both office and factory settings require 
less-skilled workers to have more skills and accept greater responsibility.  Computer-
based tasks are more varied, abstract, complex, and information intensive.  Processes are 
more integrated and interdependent.  In manufacturing this means processes are less 
segmented and operators need a deeper understanding of the whole production system 
rather than just one area.  In certain kinds of office work, lower-level clerical workers 
have responsibility for updating corporate-wide databases in which any incorrect 
information will be propagated instantaneously throughout the system without the 
previous safeguard of another worker checking its accuracy.  This requires greater 
attention to detail from workers entering information into the system.  Computer systems 
also change more rapidly than traditional equipment and require greater flexibility and 
willingness to learn, often in classroom settings rather than informally on the job (Zuboff 
1988; Hirschhorn 1984; Pullman and Szymanski 1986, pp.124f.,152; Fearfull 1992, 
pp.433f.; Hirschhorn and Mokray 1992, pp.17,20ff.; Attewell 1992, pp.56,70,74; OTA 
1986, p.341).   
Most of the results reviewed here do not support the deskilling view, but the 
question is whether the skill upgrading view exaggerates the magnitude of the changes 
claimed when the actual impact is more modest (cf. Spenner 1988).  Computer training 
data are relatively scarce, but there is the example of Internal Revenue Service agents 
who, in 1986, were issued laptops loaded with specialized software for audits and general 
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word processing, spreadsheet, database, and communications software.  They received 
seven days of classroom training and five weeks of on-the-job training, in which 
instructors accompanied or consulted with trainees and organized workshops (Pentland 
1994, pp.374f.).   The relatively modest level of training required for these novice users 
does suggest that the introduction of computers upgraded skill demands greatly, and it is 
highly likely that most of the computer fundamentals included in the training program 
can now be taken for granted for more recent cohorts entering the work force. 
Following most of the case study literature, this review focuses on the impact of 
IT on manufacturing and non-managerial, non-professional office workers.  The section 
on manufacturing concentrates on the impacts of two technologies, (1) numerically 
controlled and computer numerically controlled machines and (2) industrial robots, after 
considering some other technologies more briefly.  The section on lower-level office 
work focuses on the impacts of computers in banking and insurance and users of 
computer-aided design systems, in addition to considering some other work situations 
more briefly.  Throughout this review the focus is on results that have implications for 
employment levels, skill demands, and wages, rather than other issues such as job 
satisfaction or organizational changes, except insofar as the latter has relevance for the 
first set of questions. 
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CHAPTER 2:  MANUFACTURING AUTOMATION 
General 
Automation is a term coined after World War II in the auto industry to describe 
the use of automatic devices and controls on mechanized production lines.  As currently 
understood, automation is more than the simple substitution of mechanical action for 
human labor.  Automated equipment is at least partly governed by a programmable 
control unit and sensors that feed back real-time progress information to the control unit 
or to a control panel monitored by humans who can take corrective action if necessary.  If 
the control unit and sensors are integrated into a self-regulating system and do not require 
human intervention beyond initial set-up, like a private home's furnace and thermostat, it 
is a closed-loop system.  If sensors provide feedback to human operators who must make 
important decisions and choices, rather than conveying directly to the control unit as a 
basis for automatic action, it is an open-loop system. 
For both the general public and manufacturing management and engineers, a 
common vision is that of the completely automated process.  Since the 1950s automation 
enthusiasts have proclaimed the coming era of the fully automatic, "unmanned," or, more 
recently, "lights-out" factory.  The concept of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) 
extends the concept beyond the factory to the integration of automation at all stages of 
the production process from electronic customer ordering to computerized planning, 
scheduling, and execution of all manufacturing operations to the updating of all company 
databases (Flamm 1988, p.271).   
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However, the reality of manufacturing automation has almost always fallen far 
short of this ideal.  Machine unreliability and restrictions on the ability of human 
operators to intervene in cases of unforeseen problems has led to some significant 
failures.  The integration of manufacturing processes under complete computer control 
has also been limited by the difficulty of understanding, documenting, modeling, and 
programming processes of previously unrecognized complexity.  The lack of 
standardization across vendors has often made it difficult for machines and software to 
interface with one another and inhibited integration beyond "islands of automation" 
(Clark 1995, pp.73,77; Giertz 1987, p.8).   
Even today the degree to which automation, at any level of sophistication, is 
responsible for job losses, stunted job growth, or downward pressure on wages for less-
skilled workers is still poorly understood.  One brief review of case studies by the U.S. 
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics concluded that relatively few people 
have been laid off directly due to technological change because investment usually 
occurs during periods of economic expansion and overall job growth.  In addition, most 
new technology diffuses relatively gradually and most firms prefer to retrain and reassign 
workers if possible (Mark 1987, p.27f.).   
More formally, the U.S. General Accounting Office surveyed 400 establishments 
in 1986 to understand the reasons for plant closures and permanent layoffs.  The most 
frequent of 14 reasons mentioned were lower product demand (70%), increased 
competition (69%), and high labor costs (57%), while plant obsolescence (23%) and 
automation (16%) were ranked tenth and twelfth, respectively (cited in Cyert and 
Mowery 1987, p.60f.).    
  7
Similarly, a national survey of over 1,500 union and management negotiators 
asked which of seventeen factors most heavily influenced negotiations in 1993-1996 
contract talks.  Adjustments to new technology and pressure to upgrade skills ranked near 
the bottom in the judgment of both groups.  Less than 5 percent ranked those 
considerations as "heavily influencing" negotiations (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and 
Wells 1998, p.25.). 
Indeed, one needs to be cautious not to overestimate the employment effects of IT 
developments in the last twenty years compared to more traditional mechanization and 
rationalization that has been occurring for a long time.  For example, it was cargo 
containerization introduced in the 1960s, not the more recent use of computerized cargo 
tracking, that was mostly responsible for the fall in the number of longshoremen working 
in New York Harbor from 27,000 in the early 1960s to 2,700 today (Smothers 2000; 
Eaton 2001).  Likewise, improvements in plastic packaging in the 1970s permitted more 
meat processing tasks to be performed by less-skilled line workers in slaughterhouses 
rather than skilled meat cutters in supermarkets, putting pressure on the latter's wages and 
employment (Walsh 1993, pp.77ff.).  The effects of technological innovation on work 
and employment are nothing new to the computer age. 
One case illustrating the difficulties of full automation is Clark's (1995) study of 
Pirelli's decision to build a state-of-the-art plant for manufacturing wiring cable in Wales, 
UK in the late 1980s.  He began by noting, "In the early and mid-1980s, the holy grail of 
technical innovation was full computer control of all aspects of production and its 
correlate, the 'workerless factory'...This conception of CIM led to some enormous and 
costly mistakes" in general, including at the Pirelli plant (Clark 1995, p.72f.).  Pirelli's 
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corporate management was "totally committed to full automation and reducing the people 
element to a minimum," according to the project's manager (Clark 1995, p.84).   
The CIM system was to handle all stages of the process from receiving orders to 
completing the finished product, including sequencing orders, just-in-time delivery of 
materials at each stage of the process using automated guided vehicles (AGV), set-up and 
control of all machine processes, inventory management, quality control, and a paperless 
accounting system to track product status and cost.  Operators would monitor the process 
and troubleshoot problems (Clark 1995, pp.88f.).  
However, the complexity of the system tripled its cost, and software bugs and 
machine breakdowns required greater operator intervention and more engineering and 
maintenance staff than planned.  The plant opened in 1988 but did not achieve acceptable 
production levels until 1990, after it had reintroduced manual procedures and operator 
discretion, though subsequent improvement in the system successfully re-automated 
some of them eventually (Clark 1995, pp.97ff.,215ff.).  Ironically, one of the biggest 
problems was programming the flexibility in product changes that is commonly thought 
to be the strength of such systems.  The plant produced 600 kinds of cables; one systems 
engineer described the programming task to encompass this variety of products as "a 
nightmare" (Clark 1995, p.106).   
In terms of employment levels and composition, this plant had 156 employees 
when finally running at capacity in 1990: 56 percent were operators, 12 percent 
maintenance, and 32 percent white collar (Clark 1995, p.140).  In the absence of 
comparable figures from less automated sister plants, it is not clear how to evaluate these 
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numbers, but automation in this factory clearly did not eliminate operators or blue-collar 
workers more generally.   
Some limited idea of the skill requirements in this plant can be gathered from the 
fact that in the first year after the plant opened, employees received about three weeks of 
training total, which covered the nature of the products, safety, and the team-based 
production strategy, as well as the automated equipment.  The plant also instituted a far 
more extensive long-term training system, but the case study is somewhat sketchy on its 
details (Clark 1995, pp.41ff.). 
Some more systematic evidence on manufacturing automation can be found in the 
Survey of Manufacturing Technology (SMT) conducted by the Census Bureau in 1988 
and 1993 for selected manufacturing industries in which certain forms of automation 
were thought to be most prevalent.1  These industries accounted for 42.5 percent of total 
manufacturing employment and 7.8 percent of total employment (author's calculations, 
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group file for 1993).   
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 1 indicate that while computer-aided design and 
engineering (CAD/CAE)—an office technology described in the next section—was one 
of the most widely used advanced technology in both 1988 (reported by 39% of plants) 
and 1993 (reported by 59% of plants), its integration with the production process in the  
                                                     
1 The industries and their 2-digit standard industrial codes were: fabricated metal products (34), industrial 
machinery (35), electronic/electrical equipment (36), transportation equipment (37), instruments and 
related products (38). 
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form of computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems was relatively uncommon.  
Even in 1993 less than 26 percent of the plants surveyed could convert computer 
blueprints into machine instructions and transmit those instructions to production 
equipment.   
Numerically controlled (NC) and more recent computer numerically controlled 
machines (CNC), described further below, were the next most common technology, used 
by about 41 percent of plants in 1988 and 47 percent of plants in 1993. 
The other technologies tended to be used at low levels and showed little growth 
over the five-year period.  Programmable logic controllers (PLC), which are another 
device similar to a computer that controls industrial processes, were the most common of 
the remaining technologies.  However, the number of plants using them remained 
constant at a little above 30 percent.   
Only 13.4 percent of plants used any kind of robot in either year, and the 
percentage of users did not change over the five years despite the fascination that this 
form of automation has long attracted.  Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) are a 
more advanced form of automation that integrates two or more machines that 
automatically accept inputs and transfer outputs to one another.  In a sense, FMS is a 
more developed building block of a fully automatic or computer-integrated 
manufacturing (CIM) system.  However, only 11-13 percent of plants reported using 
FMS in either year.  Likewise, automated guided vehicles (AGV) are an advanced form 
of automation:  robotic carts that can carry materials and work in progress over longer 
distances in a plant.  Use of AGVs was very rare.  Fewer than 2 percent of plants used 
this very advanced form of automation in either year.  Most plants, it seems, found it 
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easier or cheaper to use human labor to load and unload parts from machines or transport 
them within the plant. 
Finally, electronic data interchange (EDI) refers to computer networks that link 
plants and their suppliers and customers in order to facilitate information exchange 
regarding matters such as ordering, scheduling, billing, and inventory management.  EDI 
is often said to be a critical component of a lean manufacturing strategy that allows plants 
to eliminate unnecessary buffer stocks of material inputs and the labor associated with 
them, as well as to require remaining workers to engage in more complex problem 
solving and trouble shooting to make sure that production continues to function without a 
cushion of slack resources.  If EDI is a necessary or highly complementary feature of 
such skill-enriched jobs, the data suggest only limited penetration of this production 
paradigm in the late 1980s to early 1990s; only 15-18 percent of plants used EDI at that 
time.  With developments in networking and the internet since 1993, this percentage has 
almost certainly increased significantly since the last SMT was administered. 
Both waves of the SMT asked non-users if they planned to adopt each technology 
in the next five years.  Column 2 of Table 1 gives the percentage of plants that reported 
in 1988 that they planned to adopt a technology by 1993.  When added to the figures for 
current users, the projected percentages of users in 1993 (column 3) can be compared to 
the actual percentage of users in 1993 (column 4).  Column 7 gives the actual change in 
advanced technology usage between 1988 and 1993, and Column 8 gives the difference 
between actual use in 1993 and projected use in 1993 based on stated intentions to adopt 
given in 1988. 
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While the projection for stand-alone CAD/CAE systems and NC/CNC machines 
proved surprisingly accurate, projected usage rates for 1993 were overly optimistic by 
over 10 percentage points for most of the other technologies (column 8).  For most of the 
advanced technologies, the percentage of users barely changed (column 7).  This is one 
reason to be cautious about any projections of future technology use, including similar 
responses from the 1993 survey regarding plans for adoption by 1998 (columns 5 and 6).  
Unfortunately, the SMT program was discontinued so there is not another wave against 
which the 1993 projections can be compared. 
The data in Table 1 are limited by the fact that there is no information on the 
extent of usage other than simple presence or absence within a plant.  The published 
reports indicate strong positive associations between technology use, on the one hand, 
and total plant employment and value of output, on the other.  If larger plants accounting 
for a disproportionate share of total output also account for a disproportionate share of 
technology adoption, it is quite possible that the figures in Table 1 understate the true 
impact of automation on employment.   
The SMT 1993 provides some additional information bearing on this question for 
1993.  The survey asked respondents to give the number of dedicated workstations or 
pieces of equipment for certain discrete technologies, reported in Table 2.  Since 
CAD/CAE programs can run on general purpose computers, the interpretation of this 
figure is problematic, but the much fewer numbers of integrated CAD/CAM systems is 
consistent with the results in Table 1.   
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Table 2.  Number of Dedicated Work Stations or 
Pieces of Equipment in Selected Manufacturing 
Industries (SIC 34-38) (Survey of Manufacturing 
Technology, 1993) 
Technology Number of Units 
  
CAD/CAE 179,466 
  
CAD/CAM   38,047 
  
NC/CNC 171,772 
  
Robots  
     Pick and Place   31,512 
     Other   20,706 
  
PLC 214,378 
Industries: Fabricated metal products (34), industrial machinery 
(35), electronic/electrical equipment (36), transportation 
equipment (37), instruments and related products (38) 
 
CAD/CAE = computer-aided design/computer-aided 
engineering 
CAD/CAM = computer-aided design/computer-aided 
manufacturing 
NC/CNC = numerically controlled/computer numerically controlled 
machine tools 
PLC = programmable logic controllers 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1994 (Tables 5A, 5C, 6C, 
6G, 6I, 9G) 
 
More interestingly, the survey found that there were about 172,000 NC/CNC 
machines in use in 1993.  Some, though not all, employers had machinists and operators 
work on two NC/CNC machines rather than a single machine, as was customary prior to 
automation (Shaiken 1984, pp.78,80,91).  Assuming that all employers required their 
workers to double up on the machines and experienced no increase in demand as a result 
of adopting the new technologies (both unrealistic assumptions that skew estimates of 
displacement upward), the figures for NC/CNC usage imply reduced manpower needs on 
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the order of 86,000 workers per shift or 172,000 assuming two shifts.  However, the 
actual number might well be higher because NC/CNC machines are much faster and are 
often equipped with multiple tools, potentially reducing the total number of machine 
tools in a shop that need human operators (Watanabe 1987, p.173; Shaiken 1984, p.71).  
Some generally non-representative studies estimated that NC/CNC machine tools 
displace 2-3 workers, but other estimates are highly variable and much of the estimated 
labor savings no doubt depends on whether the plants that were studied produced 
standard parts in high volume or smaller batches of more customized parts (Kaplinsky 
1987, p.86; Watanabe 1987, pp.61ff.). 
The SMT also found 52,000 robots in use in 1993.  As the discussion of industrial 
robots below indicates, most studies estimate that robots substitute for two workers, again 
assuming no increase in product demand, though there is also case study evidence that 
the displacement is far less than that.  Assuming robots eliminate the need for two jobs, 
the robot population figure above implies 104,000 fewer jobs than otherwise or 276,000 
jobs when combined with the NC/CNC figures assuming one job displaced per machine.   
Total employment in 1993 was 120.3 million workers (Economic Report of the 
President, 2004, Table B-36).  From this figure and tabulations from the Current 
Population Survey, one can calculate that for 1993 about 31.7 million Americans worked 
in what are usually considered blue-collar jobs (craft, operator, and laborer), of whom 
about 13.3 million worked in manufacturing and 5.3 million worked in the manufacturing 
industries covered by the SMT (author's calculations, Current Population Survey, 
Outgoing Rotation Group file for 1993).  Using a job displacement figure due to robots 
and NC/CNC of 276,000, this implies that about 0.23 percent of all employment,  
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0.87 percent of all blue-collar employment, 2.1 percent of blue-collar manufacturing jobs, 
and 5.2 percent of blue-collar jobs in the SMT industries were either eliminated or failed 
to be created because of the use of robots and NC/CNC machines in 1993, relative to a 
situation in which none of those technologies were used but all other relevant conditions 
were held constant.  Since this assumes no increase in product demand as a result of the 
increased productivity caused by the new equipment, these estimates could easily be 
overstated, though the omission of effects for FMS and perhaps some other advanced 
technologies biases the estimates downward.   
Nevertheless, the estimates of displacement clearly represent a very small fraction 
of total employment and even total blue-collar employment.  Assuming most of these 
displaced jobs are either not created or eliminated through attrition, rather than layoffs of 
mid-career workers, it seems likely that most people who might otherwise have filled 
these positions would have been able to find other, similar jobs without great difficulty.  
From these "back of the envelope" calculations, it does not appear that advanced 
manufacturing automation is responsible for significant loss of blue-collar job 
opportunities, though its effects in manufacturing in general and in specific 
manufacturing industries may be somewhat greater. 
By comparison, total manufacturing employment in the United States as a 
percentage of total employment fell from 22.4 percent to 13.9 percent between 1983 and 
2001, and the proportion of manufacturing workers in blue-collar occupations fell from 
62.2 percent to 57.3 percent over the same period, implying that blue-collar 
manufacturing jobs as a share of total employment fell from 13.9 percent to 8.0 percent 
(author's calculations, Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group files).  It is 
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not possible to determine how much of the 5-percentage point drop in blue-collar 
workers within manufacturing or the 6-percentage point drop within the overall 
workforce is due to new computer-based technology, developments in traditional 
technologies that were similar to those occurring throughout manufacturing history, or 
the effects of trade and offshore production.  However, these figures provide an upper 
bound on the effects of nearly twenty years of diffusion of IT-based manufacturing 
technology. 
Table 3 reports key results from a special SMT survey administered in 1991 in 
order to determine the factors affecting adoption of advanced manufacturing technology.  
The questions covered a number of areas relevant to understanding the prevalence and 
consequences of this technology, as well as the reasons for slow adoption.   
The survey found more than one-third of all plants reporting that at least 50 
percent or more of their production operations depended on CAD/CAE/CAM software; 
about 21 percent of plants reporting that at least half of their production operations 
depended on FMS/NC/CNC/Robots; and only 5 percent reporting that half of their 
operations depended on materials handling technologies (AGVs and similar equipment).  
Very few plants had invested as much as $1 million in each of these groups of 
technologies in the previous three years.  This is perhaps not surprising for CAD/CAM, 
which is mostly less expensive software, or for AGVs, which are infrequently adopted.  
However, it seems that few plants were acquiring large numbers of moderately 
expensive, high technology production equipment if more than 90 percent of plants 
invested less than $1 million in FMS, NC/CNC, and robots combined over a three-year 
period. 
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Table 3.  Percentage of Establishments with Characteristics Related to Advanced Technology 
Use in Selected Manufacturing Industries (SIC 34-38) (Survey of Manufacturing Technology, 
1991) 
 CAD/CAE/CAM FMS/CNC/Robots Material Handling 
Over 50% of operations    
depend on advanced technology 
(all plants) 36.11 21.04   4.85 
Invested at least $1M     
in last 3 years (all plants)   3.37  9.49   1.02 
Time to full operation    
no more than 6 months (adopters) 90.72 82.71 83.17 
Significant increase in    
education/training cost:    
       Adopters 20.45 16.84   6.63 
       All plants 13.45 10.82   2.57 
Education/training cost over    
$50K in last 3 years:    
       Adopters 11.53 13.12   5.13 
       All plants   7.88  8.65   2.07 
Education/training cost among    
top 3 problems in last 3 years:    
       Adopters 19.51 21.84 14.29 
       All plants 13.36 14.36   5.67 
Education/training/skills among    
top 3 barriers in next 3 years    
(all plants) 20.51 26.08 12.49 
Cost of equipment/software,    
lack of benefits among top 3    
barriers in next 3 years (all plants) 63.14 68.48 52.97 
Benefits (adopters)    
      Reduced labor costs 54.66 65.04 60.09 
      Improved quality 71.78 75.94 39.31 
      Greater flexibility 43.70 30.58 31.63 
      Reduced inventory   4.18 10.75 39.10 
Industries: Fabricated metal products (34), industrial machinery (35), electronic/electrical equipment (36), 
transportation equipment (37), instruments and related products (38) 
 
CAD/CAE/ CAM = computer-aided design/computer-aided engineering/computer-aided manufacturing 
FMS/CNC/Robots = flexible manufacturing cells or systems, numerically controlled/computer numerically controlled 
machine tools, pick and place and other kinds of robots 
Material Handling = automatic storage/retrieval, automated guided vehicle systems 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1993 (Tables 1-1 through 1-8) 
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Most plants did not report the long lead times to full use of the equipment found 
at the Pirelli plant described earlier.  One reason may be that most technology 
acquisitions were more incremental and not the kind of fully integrated automation 
strategy pursued by management in that case. 
Plants were also asked about the training implications of advanced technology.  
About 17-20 percent of those adopting CAD/CAM and FMS/CNC/Robots reported that 
adoption increased their education and training costs "significantly," but only 12-13 
percent reported spending over $50,000 on education and training in the previous three 
years.  When all plants, not just adopters, were considered, the share of plants 
experiencing "significant" increases in education and training was only about 11-13 
percent, and only 8-9 percent of all plants spent $50,000 or more on education and 
training in the previous three years because of the technology.  Materials handling 
technologies, such as AGVs, had much less impact on education and training 
requirements, even among adopters.  Thus, only about 10 percent of plants had to 
increase training significantly due to advanced technology. 
Plants were also asked to give the top three problems they encountered in 
acquiring or using advanced technologies.  About 20 percent of current users of CAD-
based programs and automated production equipment other than AGVs reported 
education and training costs among their top three problems, and a similar proportion of 
all plants reported that such costs or lack of a skilled workforce would be among the top 
three barriers to acquiring these technologies in the next three years.  However, about 
two-thirds cited cost of equipment and software as a top barrier, and about 11 percent 
also cited insufficient benefits from the technology (not shown).  Large majorities of 
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adopters cited quality improvements and reduced labor costs as among the top three 
benefits of these technologies, while flexibility and inventory reduction were mentioned 
less commonly despite their prominence in much of the literature.   
Automated Process Control 
 
One important technology not covered in the SMT is automated process control.  
This is a relatively early form of manufacturing automation used for manufacturing 
processes involving liquids or gases, such as chemicals, petroleum, steel, power 
generation, and food processing (Woodward 1965).  Sensors, central control units, and 
human operators monitor conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, chemical composition, 
material flow rates) and activate switches, valves, and other devices to control production 
according to optimizing formulas.  This form of automation has allowed the conversion 
of production from batch to an integrated, continuous process.  With computerization of 
process controls, systems can also record in a database the measures or readings used to 
regulate the production process and make them available for subsequent analyses and 
process improvement.  Operators who once worked on the factory floor—opening and 
closing valves, performing other manual tasks, and watching physical processes—now 
monitor the entire production system on computer screens in central control rooms off the 
factory floor (Zuboff 1988). 
Although these automated systems are assumed to require fewer workers, this 
issue is not well studied.  Vallas and Beck (1996, p.354) noted in passing that the 
introduction of computerized process controls in pulp and paper mills reduced crew sizes, 
but they did not give any specific figures.  Zuboff (1988, p.248f.) noted that managers in 
the pulp and paper mills she studied felt pressure from their superiors to justify spending 
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on automation based on the number of operator jobs it eliminated, but she interpreted this 
more as a ritualistic demand and also provided no specific numbers on operator 
employment before and after the switch from batch production to computerized process 
controls.  Fernandez (2001) found that no operator jobs were eliminated when a new 
state-of-the-art automated food-processing plant replaced an antiquated facility.  
However, the technology did upgrade skill requirements through changes in the plant's 
occupational composition because a greater number of skilled maintenance workers, 
particularly electricians, were hired to maintain the new equipment (for further discussion 
of this case, see Handel 2003). 
Zuboff (1988) and Hirschhorn (1984) are the most prominent researchers arguing 
that computerized process controls increase the skill demands within existing jobs.  They 
noted that this form of automation reduces physical labor and increases the amount of 
thinking needed for operators' jobs.  From the control room, operators deal with 
information rather than things.  According to this view, the new technology requires 
more theoretical knowledge, abstract thought, and procedural reasoning.  Automation 
tends to reintegrate tasks, gives workers responsibility for expensive equipment (often 
linked together into complex systems), and requires workers to have a more conceptual 
understanding of how the many parts and stages of a complex process work and fit 
together.  In addition, information technology for the first time makes a wide range of 
business and production data easily available to all workers for possible analysis.  
Workers now have at their fingertips information that was previously difficult to 
assemble and was restricted to managers.  They can track output and quality statistics and 
conduct their own experiments to improve processes.  Enlightened managements seek to 
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broaden the operators' role, though there are many cases in which management seeks to 
limit this form of operator involvement (Zuboff 1988, pp.246ff.).   
Zuboff summarized the difference between the operator's job in three pulp and 
paper mills before and after the installation of computerized process controls. 
Accomplishing work came to depend more upon thinking about and 
responding to an electronically presented symbolic medium than upon 
acting out know-how derived from sentient experience…It 
encompasses a shift away from physical cues, toward sense-making 
based more exclusively on abstract cues; explicit inferential reasoning 
used both inductively and deductively; and procedural, systemic 
thinking…A theoretical conception of the total process is essential 
(Zuboff 1988, pp.95f.). 
 
However, both Zuboff (1988) and Vallas and Beck (1996) noted that managers 
often restricted operator training and input, either to protect their own position and 
control over knowledge or because they embraced an ideology of automation that 
privileged engineering expertise over the contributions that operators could make on the 
basis of their experiential knowledge (see also Shaiken 1984).   
Neither case had much specific information on the duration or kind of training 
operators received.  In a reconditioned, unionized plant in which operators had about ten 
years of schooling, managers were especially keen to limit operator training and keep 
decision making out of operators' hands although they had shown themselves capable and 
motivated to gain more knowledge and to apply it (Zuboff 1988, pp.253f.).  In another 
newly built plant, almost half the operators had one or two years of college and operators 
received several weeks of classroom training in basic math, physics, chemistry, and the 
pulp manufacturing process, though even here management limited learning and 
autonomous decision making among operators in favor of "machine intelligence and 
managerial control" (Zuboff 1988, pp.90,270ff.,390).  However, even Vallas and Beck 
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(1996, p.355), who are more critical of existing management practices than Zuboff, 
acknowledged that the switch from batch to computerized continuous process production 
increased operator skill requirements and contradicted Braverman's (1974) deskilling 
argument, at least for this technology.  
Finally, given the common-held view that skills and wages track one another, it 
should be noted that although operators in automated pulp and paper mills had 
responsibility for more equipment and a larger swathe of the total process than 
previously, managers denied requests for higher pay from both the unionized workers in 
the older plant and the more educated workers in the new plant (Zuboff 1988, 
pp.298ff.,412f.). 
Numerically Controlled Machine Tools 
 
The skill implications of numerically controlled (NC) and computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machine tools have received more attention than most IT production 
technologies, particularly since Braverman (1974) claimed they reduced skill 
requirements for blue-collar workers and increased inequality between blue- and white- 
collar workers.  The case was considered particularly revealing because the new 
technology affected machinist occupations, which were among the highest-paid blue-
collar occupations. 
Numerically controlled machine tools were controlled by programs on punched 
paper tape, punched cards, or magnetic tape that were read by the machine's control unit 
and contained instructions that automatically guided the machine through its cutting path 
and monitored a job's progress, eliminating manual operations and control previously 
performed by a machinist.  The programs translated specifications previously contained 
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in blueprints into mathematical descriptions of parts and cutting tool paths.  Once written 
and debugged, the programs could be used to produce identical parts in unlimited 
numbers automatically.  The programs could also be stored for re-use at a later date or as 
the basis for a modified program that could be used to produce a slightly different part.  
In the U.S., technical workers in a separate department off the shop floor usually wrote 
the NC programs, removing planning skills from the machining process.  Beginning in 
the 1970s, CNC machine tools replaced more primitive NC devices with minicomputers 
and later microcomputers, permitting greater flexibility in the writing and editing of 
programs, including a user-friendly, menu-driven program interface at the machine itself 
that permitted the operator to write or edit programs without having to know a 
programming language (Noble 1979, p.23; Giordano 1992). 
As noted, the SMT gave some indication of the incidence of NC/CNC tools.  
Further detail is available from Kelley's (1989) survey of nearly 1,400 establishments in 
twenty-one manufacturing industries in 1987.  Kelley found that 47 percent of 
metalworking plants had installed one or more computer-controlled machines, but that 
even in those establishments most workers involved in machining tasks worked on 
traditional, non-programmable machines.  Overall, only about one-quarter of blue-collar 
workers who used machine tools worked with an NC or CNC machine in 1987 (Kelley 
1989, pp.302f.).  Other studies also found similarly small proportions of machine tool 
users operating NC/CNC equipment in the early 1980s (Keefe 1991, p.516). 
Most researchers have devoted attention to the effects of NC/CNC on the skill 
content of jobs rather than changes in the relative or absolute numbers of different kinds 
of machining jobs.  Most research takes Braverman's (1974, pp.199ff.) work on 
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deskilling as the starting point.  He argued that NC/CNC replaced skilled machinists with 
a relatively large number of unskilled machine operators and a handful of skilled, white-
collar programmers. 
Other research supports Braverman's position.  David Noble (1979) described the 
development of NC machine tools in the 1950s as displacing an earlier analog technology 
that never achieved great market penetration, called record-playback, which retained a 
larger role for skilled machinists.  The alternative technology recorded a machinist's 
movements on a template and stored them for repeated use in production.  Noble 
acknowledges that both manual methods and record-playback could not produce parts to 
the tight specifications of the Air Force, which was the major sponsor of NC 
development.  However, record-playback did not need new technical skills, a special 
corps of programmers, and expensive computer units.  Record-playback machine tools 
would have been more affordable than NC for smaller machine shops that did not need to 
produce to such demanding standards.   
Like Braverman, Noble attributed the success of NC to an ideology of 
engineering and managerial control that valued automation as both a symbol of progress 
and a method of reducing dependence on expensive, skilled manual workers who had the 
power to control their own work pace.  Noble cited major labor conflicts at aircraft 
manufacturers as a significant motivation for the choice to develop NC over record-
playback.  He claimed the main attraction of NC was that it offered the possibility of 
centralizing knowledge and control in the hands of management and programmers off the 
shop floor, incorporating skills into the machine, and allowing the greater use of 
unskilled workers to tend the programmed equipment in place of skilled machinists.   
  26
However, unlike Braverman, Noble also acknowledged that deskilling of 
machining work during the 1960s-1970s had not advanced very far because NC machines 
could not be operated as automatically as their boosters envisioned.  Variations in 
materials and environmental conditions, limits on the reliability of machines and 
programs, and the need to safeguard the expensive equipment required skilled machinists 
to monitor and intervene in the process (Noble 1979, p.41ff.).   
Shaiken (1984) also viewed NC/CNC machine tools as a straightforward 
extension of Scientific Management principles.  However, even more than Noble, 
Shaiken noted that while management often wants to eliminate the need for skilled 
machinists, the limits of NC/CNC technology itself usually requires a machinist's 
judgment and experiential knowledge if programs written by non-machinist programmers 
are to work in practice (Shaiken 1984, pp.80ff.).   
Braverman, Noble, and Shaiken all maintained that NC/CNC machine tools do 
not necessarily imply deskilling metalworking occupations.  Management chooses to 
separate specialized programming functions from shop floor work as much as possible, 
but it is feasible to add programming functions to traditional machinist jobs.   
However, Adler and Borys (1989) argued that NC/CNC is associated with a 
number of developments that likely increase the skill demands of factory jobs.  Low-skill 
tasks are more easily automated than more-skilled tasks.  Shop floor workers need the 
knowledge and authority to prevent costly mistakes that might damage expensive 
equipment.  The new tools permit machining of more complex parts, smaller batches, and 
more frequent product changes, all of which require more skill from production workers 
than producing large batches of standardized goods, which is more predictable and 
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routine work.  Automated technology also requires more abstract, conceptual 
understanding of the technology than manual methods (Adler and Borys 1989, pp.389ff.).  
This is in direct contrast to the deskilling perspective, which argues that the technology is 
implemented in a way that reduces the need for conceptual skill among shop floor 
workers, who merely execute the plans conceived by technical and managerial personnel 
by monitoring the equipment. 
Adler and Borys found some evidence that the wages of NC operators are equal to 
those of the highest class of conventional machinist, and they note that the addition of 
more-skilled maintenance workers and technical workers, such as programmers, 
increases total skill requirements in automated workplaces and average wages in the 
machining industry overall.  They argued that wages are a key index of skill and that 
future research should focus on this measure as a critical test of the deskilling/upgrading 
controversy (Adler and Borys 1989, pp.386,395f.).  As noted below, Keefe (1991) 
performed such a test more formally and found no effect, positive or negative, on the 
wages of production workers in shops with a high percentage of NC machines. 
Some case study research supports the skill upgrading position.  Interviews with a 
small sample of machinists found they viewed NC as involving at least as much or more 
skill than conventional machine tools because of the software knowledge required, the 
greater abstraction involved in interpreting programmed instructions compared to 
blueprints, the faster pace of model changes among NC equipment, and the greater 
responsibility for preventing costly errors, particularly damage to the more expensive 
equipment (Zicklin 1987, p.460).   
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Giordano's (1992) study of a defense contractor that produced mostly in small 
batches found that machinists believed that running an automatic machine required fewer 
machining skills, especially if the process went smoothly, since the tool was guided 
automatically rather than manually.  However, they noted that machine set-up required 
more problem-solving and conceptual skills because the tools and sequence of operations 
had to be planned from start to finish before beginning the job.  The ability of NC 
machines to perform far more precise and complex operations than was possible with 
conventional machine tools also increased the complexity of machine set-up.  Since the 
programs written by NC programmers did not consistently work as planned, the 
production process was often not automatic, at least at the beginning of a job.  Machinists 
often needed to correct problems not anticipated by the programmer and therefore still 
needed their traditional skills.  Understanding NC programming and coded equipment 
readouts in order to know when and how to intervene also required more formal study 
and knowledge.  Nevertheless, overall judgment and time to proficiency in NC 
machining were judged lower than in conventional machining, as machinists spent much 
more of their time simply monitoring the equipment.  However, the firm did not lower its 
hiring standards since the process still required workers with conventional machining 
skills on the shop floor, though other firms with NC tools did use more semi-skilled 
operators (Giordano 1992, pp.35ff.,62f.,67).   
CNC systems simplified programming considerably by replacing the specialized 
programming language and codes with pull-down menus and step-by-step queries.  As 
one machinist said, "It has a menu and asks you questions.  Like multiple choice 
questions.  They designed it for simplicity.  But you have to be an experienced machinist 
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to operate it" (Giordano 1992, p.56; see also Shaiken 1984, pp.99ff.,108f.).  In an 
interesting twist, the simplicity of the interface actually made it easier for machinists 
themselves to write and modify programs at their machines, and management at the 
defense contractor permitted this reintegration of planning and execution for work on 
CNC machines.  The increased complexity of the parts that a CNC tool could make and 
the expanded choices for how to perform operations also increased the complexity of this 
planning process relative to conventional machine tools.  Machinists' traditional math 
skills were generally sufficient for the new tasks but they had to apply those skills using a 
more demanding procedural logic.  Translating operations that were formerly manual into 
a sequence of computer instructions made the task more abstract.  However, both NC and 
CNC machines rendered traditional, complex manual skills unnecessary (Giordano 1992, 
pp.53ff.,71). 
In congressional testimony in 1982, a staff economist with the International 
Association of Machinists (IAM) reported that its 89 members working in a small 
specialty shop did not perceive the introduction of CNC as deskilling, as they were given 
training in how to edit the programs in addition to using their traditional machining skills.  
However, older workers were less comfortable with the new equipment and everyone 
was dissatisfied with the increased workload, stress, and accidents and injuries that 
resulted from running the new machines at very high speeds without a program of 
preventative maintenance.  However, in a contrary case, IAM members working for the 
service department of an airline were denied access to a free two-week training program 
offered by the equipment vendor, as the company preferred to send an engineer, 
programmer, and supervisors instead.  Two of the machinists took the manuals home at 
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night and taught themselves how to program the machine manually in six months, though 
they were officially forbidden to perform any programming or editing themselves by 
management (Bittle 1983, pp.177ff.,193ff.). 
Some survey data also confirms that most plants using NC/CNC technology do 
not generally pursue a deskilling strategy.  Kelley (1989) found that of the 47 percent of 
plants with NC/CNC tools in 1987, more than half (56%) allowed at least some workers 
in traditional machining occupations to write programs or edit programs written by others 
at least occasionally.  Among the 25 percent of machining workers using NC/CNC 
machines, 14 percent wrote programs regularly, 17 percent wrote them occasionally, 26 
percent edited them regularly, and 40 percent edited them occasionally.  Overall, two-
thirds of workers who used NC/CNC had some programming responsibilities (Kelley 
1989, pp.303f.).   
These numbers suggest that although most plants did not adopt a strong Scientific 
Management philosophy with respect to NC/CNC machine use, it does not follow that a 
high proportion of machinists were performing programming or editing tasks in the late 
1980s.  If in 1987 only 25 percent of machining workers used NC/CNC at all and two-
thirds of them performed some programming tasks, this implies that only about 17 
percent of all workers in machining occupations performed any kind of NC/CNC 
programming tasks, many of which were relatively simple and infrequent.  While there is 
little evidence of deskilling, there is equally little evidence of massive skill-biased 
technological change. 
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In addition, contrary to the implications of the theory of skill-biased technological 
change, Kelley found in a follow-up survey that a more educated workforce had no 
impact on productivity in plants using NC/CNC technology (Kelley 1996, p.392). 
Keefe (1991) analyzed wage data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 
the non-electrical machinery manufacturing industry between 1975 and 1983.  This 
industry accounted for an estimated 50 percent of the stock of NC machines at the time 
(Keefe 1991, p.504).  In cross-sectional and fixed-effects multiple regression analyses 
that controlled for a large number of covariates, Keefe found the proportion of machine 
tool users operating NC machines in a shop had no significant effect on the mean wages 
of its production workers.  The proportion using NC had a small negative effect on skill 
levels in the plant, as measured by scales constructed from the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (Keefe 1991, pp.514f.).  Weighing both the deskilling and post-
industrial views, Keefe concluded, "The spread of microelectronics appears, instead, to 
have left machine shops unchanged in many respects…" (Keefe 1991, p.517).  This 
finding contradicts both the deskilling position and the skill upgrading argument, and is 
more consistent with Spenner’s (1988) thesis of technology's limited effects on skill 
demands. 
Robotics 
 
The most common definition of an industrial robot comes from the Robotic 
Industries Association, a trade association, which defines robots as "a reprogrammable, 
multifunctional manipulator designed to move materials, parts, tools, or specialized 
devices through variable programmed motions..." (Hunt and Hunt 1983, p.8).  Robots can 
be programmed using a programming language, leading the manipulator through a series 
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of steps manually, or operating a controller while the robot records the motions for 
subsequent replication.  The first industrial robot was the Unimate made by Unimation in 
the early 1960s, but robot use is not believed to have increased much until the late 1970s  
(Flamm 1988, pp.273f.).   
While recent data are sorely lacking, early reports claimed that the most common 
applications for robots were welding, painting, and materials handling, which included 
placement/removal of parts in a machine, transferring parts between different machines, 
and loading/unloading pallets.  Less common applications included inspection and 
assembly.  It is no doubt still true that robots are often used for tasks that are repetitive, 
hazardous, or otherwise undesirable, but they can also achieve levels of precision not 
possible with manual methods, particularly in electronics assembly.  Likewise, robots 
came to be used in wafer fabrication in the semiconductor industry and similar clean 
room environments because they reduced contamination, not because they were cheaper 
than human labor (Martin 1982, pp.5f.,9; Flamm 1988, p.303). 
The possible employment implications of industrial robots exert tremendous 
popular fascination.  In 1986, a Roper poll found that 63 percent of adults thought that 
the use of robots on assembly lines would increase unemployment despite retraining 
efforts and 53 percent favored "severely limiting" their use.  A few years later (1989), a 
Gallup poll found that 52 percent of adults expected that robots would replace most 
assembly line workers by 2000 (see Public Opinion Online, Roper Center at University 
of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/). 
Even some analysts made exaggerated or extreme predictions.  Richard Cyert 
predicted that automation would reduce manufacturing employment from 22 percent of 
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the workforce in 1982 to 5 percent or less by 2000 (Business Week, 11/22/82, p.40F).  A 
leading analysis of robotics considered it possible that robots would replace almost all 
operative jobs in manufacturing by 2010 (Ayres and Miller 1983, p.51).  A study by the 
Society of Manufacturing Engineers predicted that programmable automation would 
replace half of all direct labor in final auto assembly by 1995 (Business Week, 3/26/79, 
p.94).  In the early 1980s, the Secretary of Labor said, "by 1990, half of the workers in 
any factory may well be engineers and technicians and other white collar specialists, 
rather than the current blue collar workers" (quoted in Hunt and Hunt 1983, p.2). 
Analysts also frequently attributed the competitiveness problems of U.S. 
manufacturing in the 1980s to lower rates of robot use compared to Japan.  However, 
some of the more extreme claims regarding the labor-saving implications of robots in 
Japan were shown to be exaggerated (Lynn 1983, p.21; Flamm 1988, pp.319f.; Shaiken 
1984, p.156).  Indeed, some argued that American manufacturers were much more 
predisposed than their Japanese competitors to see technology alone as a way to fix 
problems by reducing labor costs.  Rather than soliciting input from front-line workers, 
American firms favored centrally-controlled computer systems that minimized input from 
production workers in areas such as quality control and inventory reduction  (Flamm 
1988, pp.316,319). 
In general, it seems that most of the hopes and fears of the 1980s regarding both 
the promises and perils of robotics were misplaced.  An industry observer recently 
reflected on the history of industrial robotics and noted, "Every few years, a new 
technology explodes onto the scene, promises everything, dazzles briefly, and then 
fizzles. Robotics is one such technology that seemed to have it all, but then, for a host of 
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reasons, never took off as quickly as expected and never caught hold across a broad range 
of industries" (Philips 2000).  Many of the early pioneers, such as Unimation and 
Cincinnati Milacron, went out of business; and larger entrants, such as General Electric 
and General Motors, suffered significant setbacks and cut back their robotics operations 
(Philips 2000).   
General Motors (GM)'s experience in the late 1980s was one of the most widely 
publicized failures.  GM responded to surging Japanese imports with massive 
investments in automated equipment (including industrial robots), believing automation 
to be the key to renewed competitiveness.  However, the software and equipment were 
bug-ridden and failed to operate properly, and productivity remained low.  In fact, horror 
stories of automatic equipment smashing into other equipment or work in progress and 
failing to deliver parts, paint sprays, or welds to the proper place were reported widely.  
By the early 1990s, even GM executives recognized the initiative was a failure (Keller 
1989; "When GM's Robots Ran Amok," The Economist, 8/10/91).   
Other research in the early and mid-1980s indicated that robotic equipment did 
not work well for two to five years and the break-in period caused extreme stress for 
plant managers (Skinner 1983, p.105; Hunt and Hunt 1983, p.53; Jurgens, Malsch, and 
Dohse 1993, pp.189,199,359). 
However, these problems may have reflected the early stage of the robotics 
industry.  Recently, industry observers claimed there have been significant improvements 
in robot reliability, versatility, and ability to communicate with other factory software 
(Philips 2000).  Certainly the data in Table 3 do not indicate such serious transition costs, 
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though the absolute numbers of robots remains rather low even today, as discussed 
below.   
It is probable that there are large, unanticipated costs associated with 
implementing highly integrated and relatively untried systems, but that many of these 
problems can be worked out over time.  For example, the highly automated baggage 
handling system built as part of the new Denver International Airport in 1994 received a 
brief moment of fame for cost overruns, repeated delays, and test runs that sent luggage 
flying, tore them open, failed to operate at all, and had difficulty reading bar codes, 
requiring extensive manual baggage sorting (Myerson 1994).  However, the system does 
not generate such negative press any more. 
Recent media accounts of DaimlerChrysler's $700 million Jeep plant in Toledo, 
Ohio also paint a brighter picture of auto assembly automation.  The plant uses laser-
guided robot forklifts to deliver parts to the assembly line and other robots to weld the 
skeletons.  Plant managers say the robots and improved processes reduce labor 
requirements by 1,000 jobs.  However, the report does not make much of the fact that 80 
percent of the 2,100 plant employees still work on the assembly line, another 14 percent 
are skilled workers, and 5 percent are managers.  These staffing ratios seem a far cry 
from both the lights-out factory and a workforce composed mostly of technical workers.  
Likewise, a significant part of any labor savings in this plant surely reflects its 
outsourcing of significant operations to lower-wage, non-union suppliers who do not pay 
over $24 an hour plus benefits to unskilled workers, as does DaimlerChrysler (Bradsher 
2001; Siekman 2002). 
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In contrast to NC/CNC machine tools, most research on robotics has been 
concerned with changes in employment levels, rather than changes in the task content of 
jobs.  While reliable figures are scarce, the Robotic Industries Association (RIA) has a 
time series on the total number of robots used by its members, reported in Figure 1.  The 
figure for 1993 (50,000) is remarkably close to the SMT 1993 estimate (52,218), but the 
universes differ so it may reflect coincidence more than the reliability of the RIA figures.  
The most recent estimate of the total robot population uncovered from this source is 
82,000 in 1997 (Berinstein 1999, p.48). 
Figure 1.  U.S. Robot Population, 1982–97
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Numerous early studies and even some robotics industry officials seemed to agree 
that the estimated displacement effect was roughly two workers per robot, assuming no 
increase in output as a result of cost savings and price reductions (Hunt and Hunt 1983, 
p.69; Ayres and Miller 1983, p.50; Watanabe 1987, pp.2,11,91,117,187; Kaplinsky 1987, 
p.85; Munson 1983, p.201). 
  37
Hunt and Hunt (1983, p.50) estimated that the robot population in 1990 would be 
somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000.  On this basis, they estimated that robots would 
displace 6-11 percent of operatives and laborers in the auto industry between 1980 and 
1990 and 1-2 percent of semi-skilled jobs in other manufacturing industries over the same 
period, not including any possible effects of rising demand that might result from lower 
output prices (Hunt and Hunt 1983, p.82).  However, the authors also noted that 
replacement needs in these occupations as a result of quits and retirements were projected 
to exceed even their maximum estimates of job displacement due to robots (Hunt and 
Hunt 1983, pp.93ff.).  The authors concluded that the diffusion of robots would "have 
little influence on employment trends to 1990 except in highly specialized situations," 
such as auto factory paint shops (Hunt and Hunt 1983, p.98).  This assessment is 
supported further by the fact that the actual number of robots in use in 1990 according to 
the RIA estimate was only 40,000 (see Figure 1), 20 percent below the lower-bound 
estimate of the robot population used in Hunt and Hunt's calculation.  Even the figure for 
1997 was only about midway between their lower- and upper-bound estimates for 1990. 
Research on how robots change the skill content of existing jobs is even sparser.  
One study of Ford Europe in the early 1980s found that after the installation of robots, 
the company provided its maintenance workers with ten days of training in basic 
electronics, twelve days in microprocessors, and four days each in pneumatics, 
hydraulics, and fluid logic (Kaplinsky 1987, p.133).  Similarly, Hunt and Hunt (1983, 
p.121f.) reported that experienced machine repairers and electricians needed only three 
months of training or less to handle robots.  User-friendly interfaces also resulted in short 
  38
training times for technicians and other skilled workers who might need to reprogram 
robots. 
The auto industry has long been recognized as the leader in the use of robots.  
Perhaps the most satisfying case study of both the employment and job task content 
implications of robotics is Milkman and Pullman's study (1991) of GM's Linden, NJ 
assembly plant in 1985-86, after it was rebuilt to incorporate state-of-the-art robots and 
other elements of industrial automation.  After the modernization, which cost over $300 
million in current dollars, the Linden plant was one of the country's most automated 
assembly plants—replacing the assembly line with 219 robots (192 for welding, 12 for 
painting, 6 for sealing glass, 9 for training and use as spares), 186 programmable logic 
controllers to program the robots, and 113 automated guided vehicles to carry car bodies 
to different work stations.  The plant also adopted a just-in-time (JIT) inventory system, 
quality measures such as statistical process control, and employee involvement groups 
(Milkman and Pullman 1991, pp.127f.).   
The number of production workers at the plant declined from 4,460 in 1984 to 
3,283 in 1987, or 26 percent.  However, this decline reflected many factors in addition to 
changes in production technology: GM's declining market share; increased outsourcing of 
components; increased organizational efficiencies; and a changeover at the plant from 
Cadillacs and Buicks to Chevrolets, which required only about one-third the number of 
parts and far less trim (Milkman and Pullman 1991, pp.128f.,142; Milkman 1997, 
p.148f.).   
Table 4 gives a breakdown of the changes in employment levels and proportions 
for different occupations and departments in the plant.  While the body and paint shops 
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were the most automated and received 206 out of the 210 production robots, their share 
of the total plant workforce showed little change after the plant modernization.  The 
greatest loss in both absolute and relative terms was in the trim department, almost surely 
reflecting the outsourcing of seat cushions and the shift from luxury to budget car 
models, among other reasons, rather than more advanced technology.  The relative 
number of inspectors also fell significantly, while the share of supervisors fell modestly, 
reflecting organizational changes such as the quality, JIT, and employee involvement.  
The real impact of automation seems to have been the growth in the share of skilled 
workers, mostly electricians necessary to prevent costly downtime.  The share of salaried 
workers other than supervisors remained unchanged (Milkman and Pullman 1991, 
p.129ff.; Milkman 1997, p.149).   
Table 4.  Employment by Occupation and Area Before and After Automation, 
General Motors Linden, NJ Assembly Plant (1985-86) 
 Raw  Percentage 
 Before After Difference  Before After Difference
        
Production 4629 3110 -1519  82.2 76.6 -5.6 
   Body shop   568   385   -183  10.1   9.5 -0.6 
   Paint shop   681   520   -161  12.1 12.8  0.7 
   Inspection   425     177   -248   7.6   4.4 -3.2 
   Trim 1385   779   -606  24.6 19.2 -5.4 
   Chassis 1020   755   -265  18.1 18.6  0.5 
   Other    550   494     -56   9.8 12.2  2.4 
        
Skilled trades   235   425   190  4.2 10.5  6.3 
        
Supervisors   156    90    -66  2.8 2.2 -0.6 
        
Other salaried   608   437   -171  10.8 10.8  0 
        
Total 5628 4062 -1566     
Source: Milkman (1997, p.148) 
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Milkman noted, "contrary to the fear of massive job displacement that is so often 
associated with new technology, it eliminated a surprisingly small number of jobs" 
(Milkman 1997, p.148).  Commenting on the changes in absolute employment, Milkman 
and Pullman concluded, "It appears that the change in car model actually had a greater 
impact on employment levels than the technological changeover itself" (Milkman and 
Pullman 1991, p.131).  For all the talk about robot displacement, the effects seem 
surprisingly small.  Even if one were to attribute all of the absolute employment decline 
in the body and paint shops (-344) to the installation of 206 robots (almost certainly an 
overstatement given declining demand and other changes affecting the plant), this implies 
displacement of less than 1.7 jobs per robot. 
The content of jobs also showed a mixed picture.  In a sample survey of the 
plant's skilled trades (n=52) and production workers (n=217), half of the skilled trades 
workers said they used a computer on their job, mostly PLCs, but only 5 percent of the 
surveyed production workers reported computer use.  In general, the authors found only 
modest changes in the task content of jobs except for electricians, who needed knowledge 
of electronics and ability to program PLCs after the installation of automated equipment 
(Milkman and Pullman 1991, pp.132ff.).   
Table 5 reports additional results from Milkman and Pullman's survey on the skill 
levels required by skilled and unskilled production workers before and after the plant 
modernization.  Using retrospective questions, the survey found that unskilled workers 
were actually less likely to report that accuracy, concentration, judgment, and memory 
were very important for their jobs, dropping from roughly 60 percent to 45 percent in 
most cases.  Those reporting that problem-solving, reading, and math skills were very 
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important held steady at about 40 percent, 15 percent, and 7 percent respectively.  
Production workers were asked how long it would take new workers to learn how to do 
their job well before and after the changeover; the median responses were 5 and 3 days, 
respectively.  The corresponding figures for skilled workers jumped from 6 months to 12 
months.  While most of the decline among production workers reflected the change in 
auto model and the transfer responsibility for parts quality back to vendors, the few 
production workers using computers noted that they were simple to operate.  When asked 
if they would benefit from more training, less than 10 percent of unskilled workers 
responded positively.  Results were qualitatively similar in the more automated body and 
paint shops as in the plant as a whole (results not shown) (Milkman and Pullman 1991, 
pp.139ff.).   
 
Table 5.  Self-Reported Skill Requirements of Unskilled and Skilled Production 
Workers Before and After Automation, General Motors Linden, NJ Assembly Plant 
(1985-86) 
 Unskilled Workers  Skilled Workers 
 Before After Difference  Before After Difference
 Percentage Reporting Skills "Very Important" 
Accuracy/precision 71 63    -8 *  46 73    27 *** 
Concentration 58 48      -10 ***  42 60 18 ** 
Judgment 57 47      -10 ***  69 71       2 
Memory 63 42      -21 ***  56 81   25 *** 
Problem solving 41 37 -4  52 73   21 *** 
Reading 17 14 -3  23 31       8 
Math   8 6 -2  17 19       2 
        
Training time (median) 5 days 3 days -2 days  6 mos. 12 mos. 6 mos. 
Need more training  <10%    71%  
Note: Significance tests not reported for last two rows. 
 
* p < .10   ** p < .05   *** p < .01 
 
Source: Milkman and Pullman (1991, pp.140f.) 
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This is not to say that nothing had changed.  Most workers were pleased with the 
changes in working conditions in the welding area, which eliminated previously high 
levels of dirt and dangerous fumes.  Few wanted to return to the previous conditions, but 
this was not because skill requirements had increased.  One worker, referring to the body 
shop, said "The jobs are real easy over there now.  Most of the guys just have buttons to 
push for loading up stuff, and robots do it" (Milkman 1997, p.155). 
The situation among the skilled trades was much different.  For most, though not 
all, of the skill dimensions, workers reported large increases in skill requirements; these 
changes were concentrated heavily among the tradesmen servicing the new equipment 
(not shown).  They also reported that their total time to proficiency increased from 6 
months to 12 months.  Nearly three-quarters of all skilled workers felt they would benefit 
from additional training, including 87 percent of those working most closely with high 
tech equipment (not shown).  Clearly, the IT-based equipment required greater 
knowledge of electronics repair than the previous mechanical production technology (see 
also Fernandez 2001).   
In sum, both the proportion of skilled workers and the level of skill required by 
their jobs increased.  However, even after a substantial modernization effort, skilled 
workers and supervisors remained less than 13 percent of total plant employment, while 
unskilled production workers were nearly 77 percent, down from 82 percent.  This 
supports the view of another study that noted, "the full automation of assembly 
operations in car production is not in sight" (Jurgens, Malsch, and Dohse 1993, p.362). 
If skill could be reduced to a single dimension, the total skill requirements in the 
Linden plant would be the sum of that figure for skilled and unskilled workers weighted 
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by their proportion of total employment.  Given the continued need for large numbers of 
unskilled workers in the modernized plant, any skill upgrading of maintenance workers 
will be diluted in the larger scheme of things by their small relative numbers. 
The Linden case is also consistent with a study of the five largest Japanese car 
manufacturers, their major suppliers, and a sample of small subcontractors in 1983. This 
study concluded that, despite popular impressions of the role of advanced technology in 
Japanese success, "The assemblers and major component manufacturers believed that the 
overall employment impact of the microelectronic technology was marginal" (Watanabe 
1987, p.66).  Far more important for overall employment levels were product demand, 
product mix, car design, work organization (i.e., industrial engineering), and continuous 
improvement through quality circles (Watanabe 1987, p.66).  However, the study authors 
also cautioned that improvements in design are not entirely separable from advances in 
computer technology.  CAD systems can reduce the number of parts and welds, thereby 
reducing labor requirements (Watanabe 1987, pp.118,141). 
Despite the continued expansion of robot use in the 1990s (Figure 1), a previous 
assessment of the potential for robots to revolutionize industrial production is probably 
still well taken: 
...there are only a handful of major uses in which they are currently a cost-
effective solution for manufacturers.  Rather than being part of a pervasive, 
evolutionary change that is spreading through all industry, industrial robot use has 
expanded in fits and starts, as small and narrow niches have been conquered by 
more capable machines...One would be well advised to be skeptical of 
technological optimists who...project veritable tidal waves of robots inundating 
manufacturing in the medium-term future (Flamm 1988, p.317). 
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CHAPTER 3:  CLERICAL AND RELATED OFFICE WORK 
General 
 
Computers and automation are not restricted to manufacturing.  In fact, computers 
are used far more frequently by white-collar than blue-collar workers (Krueger 1993).  
As with manufacturing jobs, the question is what impact IT has on the occupational 
composition of employment and the skill content within occupations.  Like the debates 
over the nature of manufacturing work, issues of deskilling and upgrading have 
preoccupied many studies of trends in office work. 
Deskilling theory argues that computers replace more-skilled office work with 
typing pools and data entry jobs, transforming office work into white-collar "sweatshop" 
jobs involving long hours of repetitive keyboard work (Braverman 1974).  The upgrading 
position claims that computers tend to eliminate more routine than non-routine work and 
to decentralize information, making company-wide databases available to front-line 
workers for the first time.  This makes it sensible for firms to broaden jobs by delegating 
some problem-solving and discretionary tasks downward in order to improve decision-
making times (Attewell 1987; Zuboff 1988).  Many studies have focused on trends in 
banking, insurance, and similar work involving high-volume, routine information 
processing, particularly the skill content dimension, which is reviewed in detail below.   
It is also important to note some limits to office automation in the case of non-
routine clerical jobs.  Observers have long recognized some problems with the simple 
view that computers will eliminate certain kinds of clerical jobs simply by speeding up 
execution times.  Iacono and Kling (1991) noted that secretaries perform a variety of 
tasks, such as answering phone calls, photocopying, and typing documents.  If a word 
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processing program reduces the time needed to format a document by 50 percent but the 
secretary only spends 10 percent of the day formatting documents, this means only a 5 
percent gain in overall productivity.  In addition, word processing introduces new 
capabilities that may improve the quality of the final product but increase the required 
total work time (Iacono and Kling 1991, p.216).   
This view is supported by a study of the introduction of laptops to field auditors 
in the Internal Revenue Service in 1986.  Agents were pleased with the ability to save 
time on routine calculations, keep track of information, and produce professional-looking 
reports, but only 15 percent said the laptops reduced overall time spent on a case 
(Pentland 1994, pp.373,379). 
However, there is a possibly more significant consequence of IT diffusion that 
may be reducing the number of secretaries and similar, non-routine clerical workers, 
namely the new ability of managers and professionals to perform their own typing and 
clerical tasks more easily using a personal computer than by relying on clerical 
assistance.  It may not be the increased execution speed that is the critical aspect of 
computerization, but the reintegration of clerical tasks into managerial and professional 
jobs that computers facilitate. 
Banking and Insurance 
 
Decades prior to the advent of microcomputers, the banking and insurance 
industries were intensive users of mainframe computers due to the centrality of 
information management in these industries, primarily various accounting and 
transactions record-keeping functions.  Traditionally, these industries involved high-
volume, standardized, labor-intensive, paper-processing tasks performed in centralized 
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"back-office" operations.  Computers were well suited to manage and process the vast 
quantities of information generated in these businesses (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, 
pp.56,76).   
Initially, many operations in banking and insurance required repeated manual 
keyboard entry of information into centralized databases, which reinforced the use of 
factory-like operations that were the focus of deskilling accounts of office automation.  
More recent developments that have tended to reduce data entry and other low-level 
clerical work include: increased input into databases by users at point of origin (e.g., 
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)); increased use of imaging; greater communication 
between computer systems; and increased integration of databases and portability of files 
(Pullman and Szymanski 1986, p.48; Baran 1988, p.689; Carre 1997, p.22).  One 
question remaining is whether increased demand for these services is sufficient to prevent 
employment declines. 
Banking  
Specialized computer applications in banking include Magnetic Ink Character 
Recognition (MICR), introduced in 1958, which encodes customer account and bank 
routing numbers and other information on checks for electronic reading.  Computer 
networks permitted the growth of electronic funds transfer in the mid-1970s.  Diffusion 
of ATMs began in earnest in the late 1970s.  In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, point-of-
sale (POS) devices, which allowed retail purchases to be made by swiping credit and 
later debit cards, spread rapidly (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, p.56ff.).   
Many of these changes might seem at first glance to reduce clerical labor 
requirements, but their employment effects are not well studied or understood.  For 
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example, ATMs were often promoted based on predictions of labor cost savings (often 
greatly exaggerated) that were said to come from elimination of tellers (Pullman and 
Szymanski 1986, p.55; Hunter et al. 2001, p.413).  However, the percentage of tellers in 
banking remained nearly constant between 1983 and 1997, though the percentage of all 
clerical workers in banking and insurance declined from about 50 percent to 40 percent 
over the same period (Handel 2000).  It is possible that POS devices contributed to this 
drop by replacing the use of paper receipts for communicating purchase information to 
financial institutions with electronic communication.  However, this review uncovered no 
studies that investigated the issue directly. 
Turning to the issue of job content, there is a view, expressed since the mid-
1980s, that teller positions will be increasingly upgraded to include more sales and lower-
level account-management functions, though claims for this trend seem to outrun the 
actual extent of such skill upgrading (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, p.62; Hunter et al. 
2001, pp.414f.).  Banks that do pursue this policy also seek to restrain wages at the same 
time through the greater use of part-timers and other methods (Hunter et al. 2001, 
pp.415f.,420).   
Hunter and Lafkas (2003) studied the relationship between technology, work 
organization, and wages among customer service representatives (CSR) in 303 bank 
branches owned by numerous different parent companies in 1994-95.  They found that 
those CSR jobs with the maximum value on their index measuring computerization of 
non-routine tasks paid 7 percent more than those in branches in which none of these tasks 
were computerized.  By contrast, a similar index for computerization of routine tasks was 
associated with a larger premium when interacted with an indicator for participation in 
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quality circles (10%).  Computerization of routine tasks was also associated with a large 
wage penalty in branches in which CSR jobs scored one standard deviation below the 
mean on an index measuring level of discretion on the job (-11%).  There were no 
significant interactions of non-routine computerization and quality circles or the 
discretion index (Hunter and Lafkas 2003, Tables 4 and 5).  The results seem to suggest 
that computerization of more complex tasks is consistently associated with higher wages, 
but the larger payoff to computerization of simple tasks under some circumstances 
(quality circles) and the large negative effects of computerization under others (low 
discretion) complicate the picture.   
Insurance 
Computerization also came early to insurance.  In 1954 Metropolitan Life became 
the first insurance carrier to install a computer; by 1963 nearly 300 companies accounting 
for 90 percent of the industry's employment were either using computers or in the process 
of installing them.  High turnover among the young women who performed much of the 
routine clerical functions meant that any labor productivity gains from computers could 
be realized through attrition rather than layoffs, and the businesses were growing 
sufficiently that overall employment continued to increase (Hedstrom 1986).  
The insurance industry had early expectations in the 1950s that computers could 
dramatically reduce the size of the clerical workforce.  However, managers soon realized 
that automating office work would be a more gradual process.  Computers had more 
technical limitations than anticipated.  In addition, difficulties in systems analysis and 
programming, inadequate consultation with current job incumbents, and the unrecognized 
complexity of the work process performed by clerical workers all inhibited the progress 
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of office automation.  It was not uncommon for office automation projects to fall behind 
schedule and produce systems that were disappointing from the perspective of the 
original goals (Hedstrom 1986). 
In the 1960s insurance companies used computers for simple, repetitive 
transactions, such as billing and claims payments, as well as for generating accounting 
reports.  These operations were centralized into white-collar, factory-like operations.  
Subsequent automation reduced not only clerical positions, such as data entry, but also 
positions associated with routine underwriting (risk assessment and policy approval) and 
rating (premium setting).  For many firms the goal became to replace as many skilled 
workers as possible and rely increasingly on the white-collar factory model for the 
remaining work, removing knowledge and judgment from the workforce and lodging it in 
the computer system at least for the more routine operations—a model that conformed to 
deskilling predictions (Appelbaum and Albin 1989, pp.250ff.).   
Claims adjustors in branch offices and the field also used more desktop and 
portable computers to input information that was then transferred electronically to central 
databases, eliminating previous requirements for manual data entry from paper forms 
(though there is evidence that this remained relatively uncommon until the 1990s).  The 
greater use of computers reduced clerical employment but may have also reduced the 
need for mid-level skills in sales, policy-writing, and claims-processing functions, which 
could be transferred to relatively skilled segments of the clerical workforce (Pullman and 
Szymanski 1986, p.76ff.).   
Understanding how the potentially offsetting changes in the number and skill 
content of different occupations affect overall skill requirements in the industry has not 
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been easy or straightforward.  In addition, even in the mid-1990s, the spread of 
computers remained uneven.  Some companies still used systems that required multiple 
data entry and manual underwriting without computer assistance (Carre 1997, p.15). 
However, by the 1980s, the business press reported instances of significant net 
employment reductions and labor cost savings as a result of office automation.  One 
market research survey found that one-third of 400 firms surveyed said they cut clerical 
labor costs by at least 10 percent, while only about 5 percent of the firms said they cut 
middle management and professional costs by a similar amount (Harris 1987). 
Several case studies of office work in the insurance industry seem to indicate that 
both the distribution of jobs and the skill content of even lower-level clerical jobs have 
moved away from the deskilling model and toward at least limited upgrading, though the 
extent of upgrading within occupations is very difficult to pin down conclusively. 
Baran's (1988) study of the insurance industry found cases in which the new wave 
of computerization facilitated the elimination of unskilled clerical jobs in favor of new, 
more-skilled clerical positions.  As computers took over more of the routine data entry 
and even somewhat complex calculations, these jobs were given a limited amount of 
judgment and decision making in matters like routine rating and underwriting, interaction 
with agents, claims processing, and quality control—tasks previously reserved for 
professionals.  In contrast to Braverman's model of a white-collar proletariat spending 
their entire day performing deadening keyboard tasks, Baran concluded that "workers in 
the new clerical jobs, although closely circumscribed in their decision making, are a long 
way from the typing pool" (Baran 1988, p.691).  Contrary to deskilling theory, computers 
seem to be reintegrating job tasks among clerical workers in insurance.  However, 
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contrary to the large claims made for skill upgrading, most of the changes seem to be 
qualitatively modest and unlikely to tax the abilities of most of the current job-holders. 
Professionals' jobs were also upgraded as they involved more time spent on 
exceptions that could not be handled by the new clerical workers and on the development 
and marketing of new products.  The proliferation of specialty services that were 
supported by computers but could not be automated also increased the need for skilled 
professionals.  Professionals and clerical workers increasingly worked together as part of 
integrated teams serving all the needs of different classes of customers (e.g., market 
segment, geographic region), rather than being separated into different functional 
departments (Baran 1988, pp.691f).   
Nonetheless, even if computers increased job skill requirements, Baran found that 
the insurance industry also increased its use of female workers in all occupations at a 
much faster rate than the economy overall, and real wages in the industry declined faster 
than average.  Firms moved operations from major cities to suburbs in order to tap into 
labor markets with educated, married women with family responsibilities who were 
willing to work part-time for lower wages (Baran 1988, pp.701ff.; 9to5, National 
Association of Working Women 1985, p.13f.).  Skill requirements may have increased 
somewhat, but the companies used careful strategies to ensure that wages did not rise 
also. 
Appelbaum and Albin (1989) found instances in which firms pursued a deskilling 
strategy and sought to routinize as many tasks as possible.  However, other firms 
followed a different path.  In the early 1980s, one firm created a new, multi-skilled 
customer service position that had some sales responsibilities and access to underwriting 
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and rating databases in order to answer customer questions and complaints.  These 
customer service representatives had extensive product knowledge and discretion to 
make decisions up to a certain dollar amount, though computers also monitored their 
calls to maintain productivity levels.  The other main skilled clerical position in the firm 
was the claims representative.  Claims representatives  could settle most claims and issue 
a check with the aid of computer software, which automatically processed routine claims 
and provided decision guidelines for the rest.  The new customer service and claims jobs 
involved decision making that was previously performed by professional employees.  
The company eliminated almost all less-skilled clerical jobs, such as mail handling, data 
entry, coding, and verifying, as well as professional adjuster jobs (Appelbaum and Albin 
1989, pp.253,255). 
The company hired high school and college graduates in roughly equal numbers 
for the skilled jobs and provided five weeks training covering insurance and telephone 
and computer skills, followed by 3-6 months of on-the-job training.  Employees were 
also encouraged to take more insurance courses on their own time, paid for by the 
company.  However, consistent with Baran's results, the starting pay for these jobs was 
no better than average for clerical jobs ($17,560 in 2001 dollars), and mobility 
opportunities were limited as a consequence of the reduction of lower-level management 
positions and increased use of college graduates in upper management.  Computerization 
and work reorganization also allowed the company to reduce overall employment by 
more than half while maintaining the same volume of business (Appelbaum and Albin 
1989, pp.254f.). 
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Another case study of insurance companies in the mid-1990s found a similar 
process.  Microcomputers integrated customer service functions into a new position with 
broader responsibilities, eliminating typing pools and much routine filing and data entry 
(Carre 1997, p.32f.).  Educational requirements for underwriters in one firm rose to the 
point that the company recruited only college graduates for these positions.  Computers 
eliminated or shifted more routine underwriting tasks to less-skilled workers but also 
created more opportunities for skilled underwriters by enabling increases in product 
complexity and the amount of financial and other information available for decision 
making.  Reorganization also eliminated buffers between underwriters and sales agents in 
the field, requiring underwriters to communicate more with the agents.  "In this context, 
college graduates are seen as more adaptable and more desirable candidates" (Carre 
1997, p.26).  However, it is possible that further automation will eliminate underwriter 
jobs in the future as more of the underwriting function is built into the computer system 
and performed by agents in the field (Carre 1997, pp.26,31).  This particular company 
had a long commitment to avoiding layoffs, including those resulting from technological 
change, but this policy was feasible in part because of a general policy of lean staffing 
(Carre 1997, p.34). 
In addition, changes may result from workplace reorganization that is 
independent of new technology.  A different insurance company reorganized lower-level 
clerical work into similarly broader jobs and regionally based teams in order to integrate 
all tasks associated with a customer's account without any apparent stimulus from new 
information technology.  The reengineered process was simply considered more efficient 
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and effective than the previous functional organization involving more hand-offs between 
different workers and departments (Carre 1997, p.42). 
Attewell (1987) took a broader perspective on occupational change in insurance.  
He found that the percentage of all employees in insurance in the lowest-level clerical 
jobs declined steadily from 62 percent to 40.5 percent between 1966 and 1980, while the 
share of high-level computer occupations (systems analysts, programmers) grew from 5 
percent to 18 percent and the share of other high-level white-collar workers (actuaries, 
approvers, underwriters) rose from 7 percent to 12 percent.  There was little evidence of 
changing skill requirements within occupations over this period (Attewell 1987, 
p.338ff.).  This would seem to contradict deskilling accounts even for the era when 
computerization was most likely to generate large, centralized, data entry operations.  
Unfortunately, this review did not uncover a similar study for the period after 1980. 
Although technology seems to have reduced routine clerical employment in 
insurance, there are difficulties in isolating its causal impact because the industry 
deregulated and began to engage in outsourcing, including offshore production, at the 
same time new computer technology became available in the 1980s.  Deregulation 
brought new competitors into the insurance market, which reduced profits, especially 
after interest rate declines in the early and mid-1980s (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, 
pp.74f.).  As Baran observed, "Companies in which paternalism protected job security 
even through the great depression have recently been rocked to their foundation by 
layoffs of up to 1500 employees virtually overnight" (Baran 1988, pp.689,695).  It is 
highly likely that substitution of technology for human labor facilitated the layoffs among 
clerical workers (Baran 1988, pp.695ff.), but it is difficult to disentangle the effects.   
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In addition, the insurance industry increased the use of home workers in data 
entry and claims adjustment.  These women are independent contractors and paid on a 
piece-rate basis, though the extent of this practice was limited in the 1980s and its extent 
remains unclear today (Baran 1988, p.693). 
The use of offshore workers in the Caribbean for routine clerical work also began 
in the early 1980s, but it is not clear how much the insurance industry was or is involved 
in this practice.  Most accounts describe female workers entering data from airline 
tickets, credit card receipts, and medical claims.  In the 1990s, Barbados alone had 2,300 
workers in the data processing industry.  Wages were less than half the U.S. level, but 
Barbados in particular also had other attractions, such as an educated and English-
speaking labor force, favorable tax laws, and technological infrastructure (Freeman 
2000).  Recent reports in the popular press suggest that the use of offshore clerical 
workers has expanded greatly.  Scanning technology allows half a million tickets issued 
to New York City residents for simple infractions to be entered into a database by 
workers in Ghana earning less than $70 a month, more than twice the average income in 
that country.  The air-conditioned office operates 24 hours a day (Worth 2002).  
Bangalore, India has become a center for such back-office processing as well as for 
customer service call centers that handle inquiries from customers in the U.S. and 
elsewhere (Landler 2001).   
At present, the total employment effects of this form of outsourcing probably 
remain small, but they need to be recognized in any account of the employment effects of 
computer technology.  IT may sometimes upgrade domestic job skill requirements by 
changing the occupational distribution (automating less-skilled jobs out of existence, 
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increasing the absolute number of more-skilled positions) and by altering the skill content 
of jobs, but it may also simply facilitate the transfer of existing work outside the country 
to lower-wage areas. 
Survey of Banking, Insurance, and Legal Office Work 
One study is particularly notable for its level of detail.  In 1986, Pullman and 
Szymanski (1986) conducted a survey of clerical workers (n=382) and interviewed their 
managers (n=40) in nine firms in the banking, insurance, and legal services industries in 
New York City.  Nearly three-quarters of clerical respondents and nearly all their 
managers reported that computer use had increased the skills involved in clerical jobs 
(Pullman and Szymanski 1986, pp.124,139).  However, when asked for the most 
important cognitive skills demanded by their jobs, workers mentioned accuracy, 
concentration, attention to detail, good memory, and good spelling and grammar.  Even 
in banking, knowledge of math was not among the ten most important skills (Pullman 
and Szymanski 1986, p.112).  Although computers may have increased job skill 
requirements, the level of skill required did not seem to be much higher than for 
traditional clerical work. 
In addition, only 12 percent of clerical workers said people in their work unit 
received significant pay increases as a result of working with computers, though 35 
percent said computer skills made it significantly easier for people to receive promotions.  
Nevertheless, about 85 percent agreed that their jobs had little or no prospects for 
promotion overall, a circumstance confirmed by managers, who cited high levels of 
turnover as one consequence (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, pp.160,163ff.).  Other 
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contemporaneous studies also found that the introduction of computers did not affect 
compensation levels (9to5, National Association of Working Women 1985, p.29). 
However, Pullman and Szymanski also presented briefly a set of regression 
analyses that indicated that the number of computer tasks a worker performed was 
positively related to their annual earnings (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, pp.181ff.).  The 
authors did not discuss the findings in detail so it is not clear how to reconcile this with 
workers' own perceptions that computer use did not improve wages.  It is possible that 
the different levels of computer use required by jobs in different workplaces caused 
employers to use more or less rigorous selection procedures so that higher pay was built 
into jobs requiring more computer skills from the start, while respondents were only 
aware of the more restricted pay variation within their particular work group.  
Alternatively, respondents' perceptions may be correct and the regression results could be 
spurious.  Greater computer skill requirements may be associated with firms and jobs that 
paid relatively well even prior to the introduction of computers. 
One further measure of the skill changes resulting from computerization is 
training times.  Nearly half of respondents in this survey worked for companies that 
provided no formal computer training and that relied instead on a combination of on-the-
job training, co-worker assistance, and previous experience.  In firms that did provide 
training, it usually took the form of one week of half-day sessions, though in many cases 
employees were not aware of the classes or were not permitted by their bosses to take 
time off to attend them.  Nevertheless, only 25 percent of clerical respondents said their 
company's computer training was inadequate (Pullman and Szymanski 1986, pp.143ff.).  
Overall, this does not suggest a great deal of skill upgrading within jobs.   
  58
Nevertheless, Pullman and Szymanski concluded that the least-skilled clerical 
jobs were declining because many previously narrow jobs were consolidated into broader 
jobs; because professionals and others were more likely to input data as an integrated part 
of their jobs; and because computers enabled greater use of self-service operations.  They 
noted that the ratio of clerical workers to professionals declined as a result of these 
processes, but even many of the enlarged clerical jobs in their sample were highly 
repetitive, routine, and frequently accompanied by heavier workloads (Pullman and 
Szymanski 1986, pp.91,126,136,165). 
Other Clerical Work 
Clerical work outside of banking and insurance is not easily characterized overall 
because it is more heterogeneous.  Some jobs, such as secretaries, have much greater 
variety, but others are more routine. 
Laudon and Marr (1995) studied IT's effects on the level and occupational 
composition of employment in two settings similar to banking and insurance in their level 
of routine clerical functions.  They examined employment at the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) between 1975 and 1990.  
Both are large organizations with an extraordinary amount of routine information and 
paper processing.  In 1990, SSA employed 65,000 workers and generated roughly 45 
million checks per month.  The IRS employed 120,000 workers and maintained earnings 
records for roughly 200 million employed Americans and 4.4 million other reporting 
entities.  Both agencies experienced dramatic increases in computing capacity in the 
1980s.  At SSA, clerical workers' share of total employment dropped modestly from 28.5 
percent in 1975 to 26.2 percent in 1990, while the clerical share at IRS rose from 24.9 
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percent to 31.1 percent over the same period (Laudon and Marr 1995).  It is not clear 
what is responsible for the modest character of the changes, but they certainly do not 
suggest that automation has eliminated clerical work in all routine paper- or information-
processing industries. 
Mail sorting in the U.S. Postal Service is another setting that involves an 
extraordinary amount of physical paper processing, and for many years mail-sorting 
operations remained relatively labor intensive.  By the early 1990s the Postal Service 
processed over 165 billion pieces of mail per year (Baxter 1994, p.146).  Prior to the 
1960s conveyer belts linked sorting operations, but postal clerks had to memorize 
processing schemes, read addresses, and insert mail manually into the correct slot in a 
metal case containing 77 slots.  In the 1960s the Postal Service introduced mechanical 
letter-sorting machines that automatically fed letters to the sorter's station at a rate of one 
per second; sorters entered the routing code into the machine, which then directed the 
letter to the proper compartment (Baxter 1994, pp.70ff.).  The Postal Service began to use 
optical character readers (OCRs) during the late 1960s, but they were not cost effective 
until the 1980s.  Improved OCRs were integrated with zip code databases and ink jet 
printers that sprayed bar codes on pieces of mail, which were then read by bar code 
scanners and automatically sorted into bins (Baxter 1994, pp.149ff.). 
However, despite extensive automation efforts in the 1980s, there has been 
remarkably little change in the occupational distribution within the Postal Service.  The 
share of supervisory, technical, and maintenance workers rose from 11.5 percent in 1981 
to 12.4 percent in 1990.  The trends for clerks and letter carriers are harder to calculate 
because the Postal Service classified part-time workers as a distinct group in the early 
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1980s, even though they worked mostly in those two occupations.  However, it appears 
that between 1986 and 1990, the share of clerks dropped from about 50 percent of total 
Postal Service employment to about 49 percent (author's calculations from Baxter 1994, 
pp.169f.).  Obviously, these are not large changes despite the enormous potential for 
economies of scale in computer-assisted or automated letter sorting in the back-office 
operations of the Post Office. 
In the late 1980s Attewell studied routine clerical work in a wide range of 
businesses and found that the switch from batch to online, real-time computing was 
associated with a reintegration of tasks into broader jobs similar to that described for 
insurance.  For example, clerks who had previously only recorded order information now 
also used the computer system to check inventory, estimate delivery dates, and 
sometimes check the customer's credit or payment history (Attewell 1992, p.72f.).  
Attewell was impressed with the upgrading involved but, though the trend is contrary to 
deskilling, the changes seem more like classic examples of job enlargement rather than 
job enrichment.  Instead of performing a single simple task, most people seem to be 
doing multiple simple tasks, and it remains to be demonstrated that this has large impacts 
on either the kinds of workers hired or the wages they are paid. 
Finally, one might note a study published in the mid-1980s that predicted (1) 
computerization would increase productivity so greatly that secretaries, bank tellers, and 
telephone operators in 2000 could complete as much work by lunchtime as equivalent 
workers accomplished in an entire day in 1977, and (2) photocopying jobs would be 
eliminated by the ability to print directly from files stored on computers (9to5, National 
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Association of Working Women 1985, pp.18f.).  Roughly speaking, this implies an 
annual productivity growth rate of 3.75 percent.2  While reviewing the research on
                                                     
2 Assuming a 7-hour workday, the prediction implies total productivity gains of 7/3=2.33 over 23 years.  
This implies an annual productivity growth rate of [(2.331/23)-1] *100 = 3.75. 
productivity in these areas is beyond the scope of the present project, data from the 
Current Population Survey suggest that only the case of telephone operators comes close 
to this figure (Handel 2000).  Needless to say, photocopying has not been eliminated. 
Nevertheless, the clerical workforce has declined, as has the ratio of secretaries to 
managerial and professional staff, also predicted by the study (9to5, National Association 
of Working Women 1985, pp.9,19; Handel 2000).  It is unclear how much of this is 
purely a result of computers eliminating secretarial functions or making it more practical 
for managers and professionals to perform tasks directly on their own computers, as 
opposed to business efforts to rein in personnel costs.  In the end, the processes may be 
inextricably intertwined and the distinction may be academic given the way the former 
facilitates the latter. 
Computer-Aided Design 
 
The final area of office work in which the effects of computers has been studied 
in detail is the effect of computer-aided design (CAD) on engineering and architectural 
drafting.  CAD software originated in the 1960s but became particularly widespread 
beginning in the 1980s.  CAD programs allow engineers, architects, drafters, graphic 
designers, and their assistants to draw and revise plans and blueprints as often as 
necessary, manipulate lines and shapes easily, automatically calculate and recalculate 
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dimensions, and modify previous, archived designs for new situations.  CAD software 
also makes it possible to print drawings as often as necessary, eliminating the need for 
copying or redrawing labor.  In addition, CAD allows designers to simulate different 
scenarios on the computer, which eliminates the need for time-consuming physical 
prototypes or testing in many cases.  CAD systems can also construct lists of required 
parts and materials for jobs for production planning purposes, revising them 
automatically as the design is altered (Liker, Fleischer, Arnsdorf 1992; Giertz 1987, p.9).   
As a building block of a more fully automated factory, manufacturing CAD 
systems can be linked to computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) software that controls 
machine tools or other mechanical equipment, which can then execute CAD designs 
automatically.  CAD/CAM also creates a computer database of designs for future use.  
As with NC/CNC, this has the potential to reduce skill requirements among skilled trades 
workers.  However, in practice, problems with the CAD-generated instructions—due to a 
factory's environmental conditions, idiosyncrasies of specific machines, or problems with 
the CAD-generated programming instructions themselves—often require human 
intervention by skilled workers at the point of production.   
Among drafters, the simplest use of CAD programs is as an electronic drawing 
board that allows the user to revise two-dimensional drawings more easily and rapidly 
and reproduce repetitive material, similar to the way writers use a word processor.  CAD 
drawings are also more precise and can represent greater design complexity than most 
manual techniques.  More complex functions involve modeling three-dimensional 
objects, including identifying relationships and any inconsistencies between different 
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parts of an overall design, many of which are drawn by other members of a large project 
team (McLoughlin 1990, pp.221f.).   
CAD's potential productivity advantages, then, include: greater speed, accuracy, 
and convenience in drawing objects and performing calculations; and the ability to 
visualize and simulate three-dimensional objects, construct more complex designs, and 
improve information flow between different designers and between designers and 
manufacturing or construction processes, including customers and suppliers at other 
firms (McLoughlin 1990, p.222; Liker et al. 1992, p.74; Giordano 1992, p.110).  The 
most extreme predictions in the early 1980s were that CAD might eliminate drafters by 
2000, but the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics correctly predicted 
that the number of drafters would actually increase (cited in Attewell 1992, p.75). 
The question is whether CAD affects occupational skill requirements or the 
occupational composition of the design and drafting work force to any appreciable 
degree.  One clue is the rising perception by the 1990s that previous predictions of 
productivity gains from CAD were vastly overstated and a growing awareness that high-
level program features were underutilized significantly (Liker et al. 1992; Harris 1994). 
One study of CAD use in the early 1980s in five British firms (manufacturing, 
shipbuilding, construction, engineering services) found the jobs that were affected 
required fewer manual drawing skills than previously. However, the programs may 
require more abstract reasoning skills and allow some design functions previously 
performed by architects to be delegated to drafters.  The greater integration of processes 
across department also meant that members of the drawing office had to have a broader 
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understanding of the complete process than previously so that they understood the 
implications of their actions for other users (McLoughlin 1990, pp.223f.). 
However, this was counterbalanced by the fact that many firms had dedicated 
CAD operators who performed routine work involving the production or alteration of 
standardized drawings, sometimes working in central offices like the word processing 
typing pools criticized in the deskilling literature.  In other cases, professionals, rather 
than dedicated CAD operators, used the programs.  However, even in these cases, there 
was often extensive underutilization of the more advanced software capabilities due to a 
lack of management commitment and training.  Consequently, CAD was often used for 
routine drafting activities (McLoughlin 1990, pp.226ff.).   
A study of six American manufacturing firms in the Fortune 100 produced similar 
results.  In 1988 Liker, Fleischer, and Arnsdorf (1992) surveyed designers and design 
engineers (n=243) and interviewed managers, engineers, and drafters (n=77) at ten sites 
in six firms (aerospace, autos, consumer products).  They found that few firms used CAD 
for more than two-dimensional drafting, "drawings that were essentially electronic 
rendering of blueprints" (Liker et al. 1992, p.77).  Most of these companies simply 
replaced drawing boards with CAD systems.  The major exception was the use of CAD 
to construct wireframe models, but more complex models of surfaces and solids were 
rare, in part due to the complexity of representing 3-D shapes on the screen.   
In addition, most designers created new parts without borrowing from archived 
designs.  Most designers found that contributing to the creation of design libraries was 
too time-consuming, but this limited the productivity gains from reusing routine parts of 
designs (Liker et al. 1992, p.77).  Work processes remained segmented across traditional 
  65
boundaries.  Design and manufacturing remained isolated from one another and, at one 
firm, CAM data were entered into the computer by hand from blueprints.  The authors 
found few true examples of integrated CAD/CAM, and suppliers for many companies did 
not have the technology or compatible systems to access the contractors' CAD databases 
(Liker et al. 1992, pp.79ff.).  In many cases, the most advanced CAD features were 
simply not necessary for the design task (Liker et al. 1992, pp.82ff.).   
These studies suggest that CAD is unlikely to affect skill demands greatly, 
whether through changes in the occupational distribution or changes in the skill content 
of existing jobs.  Improvements in design efficiency do not seem to be so great that many 
drafters will be displaced, and the use of advanced CAD features seems too limited to 
greatly affect skill requirements within drafting or design engineering jobs. 
However, there are somewhat contrasting cases.  Giordano's study (1992) of a 
defense contractor found that CAD eliminated manual drafting skills and simplified some 
of the other skills that were traditional tickets for drafters to be promoted to more 
complex design work.  However, CAD also required the ability to think more abstractly 
(Giordano 1992, pp.124f.). 
A study of an engineering design department of a large American aerospace 
company in the mid-1980s found that designers estimated they needed 9.4 months of 
formal training and learning-by-doing to reach an adequate level of proficiency on the 
CAD system.  However, only half of the 1,500 designers employed by the company used 
CAD frequently in their work.  The study also cited other research that found training 
times for designers only half as long as for this company (Harris 1994, p.247). 
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It is possible that recent developments have made CAD software easier to learn 
because the interface is more user-friendly or have made it more challenging by adding 
more complex functions, but this review did not uncover research dealing with these 
questions. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RETAIL 
A final area that is much less studied is the impact of IT on retail employment.  
Despite rapid diffusion of bar code scanners and point of sale terminals in grocery stores, 
the percentage of industry employees who were cashiers rose modestly between 1983 and 
1993, while the relative number of managers declined (Moody 1997, pp.13,23; Handel 
2000). 
An emerging area of particular interest is electronic commerce.  E-commerce has 
been defined as including the use of a computer network or the internet to order, bill, and 
pay for goods and services, share databases across organizations, manage inventory, 
transfer funds, update records, satisfy customer inquiries, and provide other information 
(Hecker 2001). 
Hecker's (2001) impressionistic survey is one of the few papers to address the 
employment impacts of e-commerce.  However, the article generally describes possible 
future developments, rather than actual impacts, because e-commerce is still too small to 
have much impact.  Hecker believes that e-commerce will dampen growth in a range of 
lower-level white-collar office occupations, such as bookkeepers, purchasing and 
warehouse personnel, clerks, travel agents, bank tellers, retail sales workers, and postal 
clerks.  This reflects two characteristics of e-commerce:  it is a higher level of office 
automation, and it transforms more transactions into self-service.  Most of the jobs 
affected are relatively less skilled.  For example, Hecker is less confident about any 
negative impacts of distance learning on employment in educational institutions.  
However, other more-skilled occupations, such as stockbrokers and insurance agents, 
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may also face employment declines because the use of the internet facilitates self-service 
(Hecker 2001, p.13). 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS 
Case studies, by their nature, do not involve representative samples, often do not 
collect standardized information, and tend to produce diverse conclusions.  
Consequently, they are difficult to use as a basis for generalization.  However, they also 
study particular situations in greater detail than survey data and produce rich information 
about which many survey studies can only speculate. 
Not all of the evidence from the studies in this review points in the same 
direction.  Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions are possible.  It seems safe to say 
that extreme views regarding job displacement, skill upgrading, and deskilling are 
mistaken.  The effect of IT on employment levels, occupational composition, skill 
requirements within jobs, and wages are more modest than either proponents of the skill-
biased technological change or deskilling theories believe.  It does seem that 
technological change works mostly in the direction of skill upgrading, but the magnitude 
of these effects is unclear and may be gradual enough that their impacts are easily 
absorbed.  There is little compelling evidence on the face of it that would support the idea 
that information technology has been a significant source of increased U.S. wage 
inequality.   
Nevertheless, fuller understanding of this issue requires the collection of more 
standardized data on employment and wage implications of new technology.  If further 
progress is to be made on these questions, representative surveys, sectoral studies, and 
case studies should investigate more systematically, as an explicit part of their research 
design, precisely how IT affects industry employment, occupational composition, skills 
within jobs, and wages.  
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